3.15

Machiavelli

A virtuous tyrant to maintain his tyranny ought to maintain partialities and factions among his subjects, and to slay and take away such as love the commonwealth. (Discourses, book 2 chapter 2; book 3 chapter 3)
 
 
It most commonly happens that what is profitable to a prince is damaging to his subjects, and what is profitable to his subjects is damaging to him; which often causes princes to become tyrants, better loving their own profit than that of their subjects. As also the contrary makes subjects often arise against the prince, not able to endure his tyranny and oppression. To keep subjects then, so they do not conspire and agree together to arise against his tyranny, he must nourish and maintain partialities and factions among them. For by that means you shall see that distrusting each other and fearing that one will accuse and disclose another, they will not dare to enterprise anything. But here withal he must cause all to be slain who love liberty and the commonwealth and who are enemies to tyranny. If Tarquin the last king of Rome had well observed this maxim, and had caused Brutus to be slain, no man would have been found that dared enterprise anything against him, and then might he always after have exercised his tyranny at his pleasure without control.  

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Answer

 
Machiavelli has showed how a prince should best become a tyrant, namely by exercising all manner of cruelty, impiety, and injustice, after the examples of Cesare Borgia, Oliver de Ferme, and Agathocles; now he shows how he may maintain and conserve himself in his tyranny, by feeding and maintaining partialities and divisions among his subjects, and putting to death those who appear to be curious lovers of the common weal, because none can love the good and utility of the common weal but must be an enemy of tyranny. As contrary, none can love tyranny but must be an enemy to the common weal. For tyranny draws all to itself and despoils subjects of their goods and commodities, to appropriate all to itself, making its particular good from what belongs to all men, and applying to its own profit and use what should serve for all men in general. So it follows that whoever loves the profit of a tyrant consequently hates the profit of his subjects, and he who loves the common good of subjects hates the particular profit of a tyrant. But thus speaking I do not mean of tributes which are lawfully levied upon subjects; for the exaction of taxes may well be the work of a prince and a just ruler; but we speak of the proper and particular actions of tyrants.

   Surely indeed, if there is any proper and mere means to maintain a tyranny, it seems well that what Machiavelli teaches is one, to maintain subjects in partialities and divisions. For as Quintius said when he exhorted the towns of Greece to accord among themselves, “Against a people who are in a good unity among themselves, tyrants can do nothing; but if there is discord among them, an overture is straight made for him to do what he will.” I freely then confess, and if I would deny it, experience proves it, that in this point Machiavelli is a true doctor who well understands the science of tyranny, and no man can set down more proper precepts for so wicked a thing than what this maxim contains, namely, to slay all lovers of the commonwealth and maintain partialities among other subjects. Surely if anything serves to maintain a tyranny, these seem most proper and fitting; for they are made from the same mold that tyranny itself is, and drawn from one same spring of most execrable wickedness and impiety.

   But yet I will hold that neither these tyrannical precepts nor any others can long maintain a tyrant or a tyranny. For the ordinance of God, being far stronger than any detestable precepts of Machiavelli, repugns them, and never suffers tyranny to be of any long endurance; as we have before showed by examples of Nero, Caligula, Caracalla, and Domitian. Sophocles says, “No man did ever see a tyrant once to prove godly.” And because tyrants are always full of impiety, God, with whom they strive, brings his justice upon them; yea he commonly makes them pass the edge of the sword, or else to die from some other strange and violent death. For as Juvenal says, “A tyrant seldom life doth end, but by the sword, which God doth send.” And besides that, God brings them to a tragical and miserable end; even during their lives they are continually tormented in their consciences with fears, distrusts, and furies, which so trouble them day and night that they obtain no rest. To this purpose Tacitus rehearses that when Tiberius was come to the highest degree of his tyranny, remaining in a place near Rome called Cheurieres, he wrote a letter to the Senate which showed that he felt himself every day more and more tormented and troubled in conscience, because of the cruelties and injuries which he exercised. This is then not without cause, added Tacitus, that an excellent wise man (meaning Plato) affirms that if tyrants’ souls might be seen uncovered, a man should see them torn and wounded with blows of cruelty, riotousness, and wicked counsel, as we see bodies ulcerated with rods and cudgels. What pleasure could Denis the tyrant of Sicily have, who trusted none? When one day a certain philosopher told him that he could not be but happy, who was so rich, so well served at his table, and had so goodly a palace to dwell in, and so richly furnished. Denis answered him, “Well, I will show you how happy I am.” And withal he led that philosopher into a chamber gallantly hanged with tapestry, and laid him on a gilded rich bed; there were brought exquisite and delicate viands and excellent wines. But while the servants made these provisions for monsieur the philosopher, who was so desirous of a tyrannical felicity, another varlet fastened by the hilts to the upper bed a bright shining sharp sword, and this sword was hung only on a horse’s hair, the point of it right over the philosopher’s face so newly happy; who immediately as he saw the sword hang by so small a thread, and right over his visage, lost all his appetite to eat, drink, or to muse at or contemplate the excessive riches of the tyrant, but continually cast his sight upon that sword. And in the end he prayed Denis to take him from the supposed beatitude wherein he was laid, saying that he would rather be a poor philosopher than in that manner to be happy. “Did I not then say well to you,” answered the tyrant, “that we tyrants are not so happy as men think, for our lives depend always upon so small a thread?”

   What repose could Nero have, who confessed that often the likeness of his mother, whom he slew, appeared to him, which tormented and afflicted him; and that the furies beat him with rods and tormented him with burning torches. What delicateness or sweetness of life could Caligula and Caracalla have? Who always carried coffers full of all manners of poisons, as well to poison others as themselves in case of necessity, for fear they should fall alive into the hands of their enemies. Heliogabalus also, what comfort had he in the world? Who provided always cords of silk to hang himself, and brave poinards and golden swords, exceedingly sharp, in like manner at a need to slay him. And indeed it is one of the greatest wisdoms that can be in a tyrant to take a good course for his death, when it is necessary and expedient for him. For they are often troubled, and come short therein, as we see of Nero, who in his need could find no man who would slay him, but was forced to slay himself. True it is that his secretary held his hand, that with more strength and less fear he might dash the dagger into his throat, yet neither his secretary nor any other person would of themselves attempt it. If this secretary had been one of Machiavelli’s scholars, it is likely he would have proved more hardy.
   But we have to note, upon this maxim as well as the former, that by his precepts here Machiavelli tends and goes about to form a tyrant; and that we ought to hold for a true tyrant every prince and ruler who uses these precepts and practices them. That is, he who uses the cruelties commended by Machiavelli, who maintains his subjects in division and partiality, and who seeks to slay all those who love the commonweal and desire a good reformation and a good policy in it. There are also other tokens and marks whereby to know a tyrant, as those which we have before cited out of doctor Bartolus, and those also which historiographers have marked to have been in Tarquin the Proud. For they say that when he changed his just and royal domination into a tyrannical government, he became a contemner and despiser of all his subjects, both plebian and patrician. He brought a confusion and a corruption into justice; he took a greater number of servants into his guard than his predecessors had; he took away the authority from the Senate; moreover, he dispatched criminal and civil cases after his fancy, and not according to right; he cruelly punished those who complained of that change of estate as conspirators against him; he caused many great and notable persons to die secretly without any form of justice; he imposed tributes upon the people against the ancient form, to the impoverishment and oppression of some more than others; he had spies to discover what was said of him, and punished rigorously those who blamed either him or his government. These are the colors wherewith the histories paint Tarquin, and these are ordinarily the colors and livery of all tyrants’ banners, whereby they may be known. It seems that Tarquin forgot nothing of all that a tyrant could do, but that he did not slay Brutus, which was a fault in the art of tyranny (as learnedly Machiavelli notes it), which fell out to be his ruin. But the cause hereof was that Brutus in the court counterfeited the fool, and Tarquin had no suspicion of him. For none but wise men and good people are suspect and grievous to tyrants; but as for counterfeiting fools, spendthrifts, flatterers, bawds, murderers, inventors of imposts, and such like dregs and vermin of the people, they are best welcome in tyrants’ courts. Yet even among them, tyrants are not without danger; for among such fools sometimes it happens a Brutus will at last play out their ends. So that their lives ever hang by a small thread, as Denis the tyrant said.

   But the example of Hieronymus, another tyrant of Sicily, is to this purpose well tobe noted. This Hieronymus was the son of a good and wise king called Hiero; whom they also called a tyrant, because he had no legitimate title, though he exercised it sincerely and in good justice. When Hiero died he left his son very young, and gave him fifteen tutors to govern his affiars; among them Andronodorus and Zoilus, his sons-in-law, and one Thraso, who he charged to maintain Sicily in peace, as he himself had done for the space of fifty years. Especially he charged that they should maintain the treaty and confederation with the Romans, as he had all his reign. The said tutors promised to perform his request, and to change nothing in the estate, but altogether to follow his footsteps. Straight after Hiero was dead, Andronodorus being angry because of so many tutors, caused the king (who was but 15 years old) to be proclaimed of sufficient age to be dismissed of tutors, and so dispatched himself and others of that dutiful care they ought to have had of their king and country. After, he got to himself alone the government of the kingdom; and to make himself feared under the king’s authority, he took to him a great number for his guard, wore purple garments and a diadem upon his head, and went in a coach drawn with white horses, altogether after the manner of Denis the tyrant, and contrary to the use of Hieronymus. Yet this was not the worst; for besides all this, Andronodorus caused the young king, his brother-in-law, to be instructed in pride and arrogance, to contemn every man, to give audience to no man, to be quarrelous and to take advantage at words; of hard access, given to all new fashions of effeminacy and riotousness, and to be immeasurably cruel and thirsty for blood. After Andronodorus had thus framed to his mind this young king, a conspiracy was made against him (unto which Andronodorus was consenting), to dispatch and slay him; it was discovered, but still executed, which was strange. For one, Theodorus was accused, and confessed himself to be one of the conspiracy, knowing he must die; and desiring to be revenged of that young tyrant, he accused the most faithful and truest servants of the king. This young tyrant, rash and inconsiderate, straight put to death his friends and principal servants, by the counsel of Andronodorus, who desired nothing more, because they hindered his designs. This execution performed, immediately the young tyrant was slain by the conspirators themselves; which was made easier by the discovery of the conspiracy, because the tyrant’s most faithful friends and servants were slain. Soon after the tyrant’s death, Andronodorus obtained the fortress of Syracuse; but the tumults and stirs which he raised in the country (as he thought for his own profit), fell out so contrary to his expectation that finally he, his wife, and all their race were exterminated, the innocent as well as the guilty. And so does it ordinarily happen to all young princes who by corruption are degenerated into tyrants. So falls it out also unto them who are corrupters of princes, to draw them into the habits of wickedness.

   Lastly, here should not be omitted this wickedness of Machiavelli, who confounding good and evil together, yields the title of virtuous unto a tyrant. Is not this as much as to call darkness light, vice good and honorable, and ignorance learning? But it pleases this wicked man thus to say, to pluck out of the hearts of men all hatred, horror, and indignation which they might have against tyranny, and to cause princes to esteem tyranny good, honorable, and desirable.